Reference:Fighter Defence before Fighter Command
From OnAirpower.org
Fighter Defence before Fighter Command: The Rise of Strategic Air Defence in Great Britain, 1917-1934
|
|
[edit] Notes
[edit] Air Defense around London in WWI
(pg. 853) By 1918, Britain had developed an elaborate Air Defense system around London, called the "London Air Defence Area" (LADA) to fend off German Zeppelin and bomber attacks.
"signals intelligence provided timely notice of all Zeppelin raids between 1915 and 1918 and of every airplane attack in 1918--while ground-based observers using visual and aural means of location provided decent tactical information."
"Within one minute the headquarters at LADA could receive and process reports from thousands of observers, place them before commanders, and despatch orders to aircraft standing ready on the runway. These aircraft were in the air within two and one-half to five minutes. By the end of the war, with radio-telephones provided to some squadrons, this system was on the technical verge of conducting ground-directed interception of enemy bombers at twenty thousand feet."
(pg. 854) The actual effectiveness of the system was limited by the ability to control aircraft in-flight:
"Ground commanders had strong early warning, tactical intelligence which was excellent at day and often good at night, and processed all this with remarkable effect, but their inability to communicate with airplanes in the air precluded effective and economical operations or guided interceptions."
"Interception rates were low--only 3 percent of fighters despatched on a given mission struck an enemy, only 10 percent of intruders were hit."
"Throughout 1918 German night raiders engaging this system suffered staggering losses to combat and accident (21 percent). Following exercises when radio-telephone was available for aircraft, London Air Defence Area's commander, General Ashmore, expected 12 percent of his fighters to intercept incoming raiders, and this was probably right."
[edit] Trenchard's Views on Airpower
(pg. 848) Quote from Trenchard (July 1923) on air offense vs. defense:
"Would it be best to have less fighters and more bombers to bomb the enemy and trust to their people cracking before ours, or have more fighters in order to bring down more of the enemy bombers. It would be rather like putting two teams to play each other at football and telling one team they must only defend their own goal, and keep all their men on that one point. The defending team would certainly not be beaten, but they would certainly not win, nor would they stop the attack on their goal from continuing.... I feel that although there would be an outcry, the French in a bombing duel would probably squeal before we did. That was really the final thing. The nation that would stand being bombed longest would win in the end."
(pg. 848) Quote from Trenchard (December 1923) on the aim for winning wars:
"[is to go] straight at its main objective the destruction of the enemy's will power."
(pg. 848) Quote from Trenchard (July 1923) on winning war by defeating the enemy's ability to fight:
"The one that stood it longest would win. The enemy would have to go up just as often as we should... a little must be allowed for character.... If we could keep going longer than the enemy that was where we would score. It was not a matter of mathematical calculation . . . if you kill a soldier with 100 rounds of ammunition, you do some good. If you kill 100 soldiers with 100,000 rounds of ammunition you do more good. But if you destroy or prevent the provision of armies, in other words the nation, the army is bound to perish and does not matter."
(pg. 851) Quote from Trenchard (July 1923) on the debates in the RAF on air defense:
"the matter was being looked at from the wrong point of view, and... the defence of this country was being reckoned with without taking [into] account the offense against the enemy... it is easy to lose sight of the effect one is making on the enemy if one is too anxious to safeguard oneself from attack. What often happened was that the enemy suddenly collapsed, just as the people at home were beginning to lose heart. Our people would undoubtedly squeal if they were bombed, but we should find, if we bombed the enemy enough, that he would collapse before we did."
